This paper develops a simple two-country model that explores how trade liberalization a®ects¯rms' incentives to merge both nationally and internationally. In the model,¯rms sell di®erentiated goods and compete in prices in a concentrated international oligopoly. Endogenous merger formation approach is used to show that two e®ects are important determinants of industry restructuring: tari® savings and protection gain. The e®ect of own trade liberalization on a country's industrial structure depends upon the other country's trade policy. If the other country practices free trade, unilateral liberalization by a country yields international mergers whereas if it practices a restrictive trade policy, national mergers arise. Moreover, bilateral trade liberalization results in international mergers. These results¯t well with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in international merger activity. Finally, we¯nd that social and private merger incentives become aligned together as trade gets liberalized.
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the world economy has experienced a large wave of mergers. One particular characteristic of this merger wave is the high incidence of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A's). In fact, international mergers and corporate take-overs have become an important vehicle for foreign direct investment (FDI)°ows between developed countries. Crossborder merger activity involving developing countries, although quite small by the standards of developed ones, has also greatly expanded during the last¯fteen years.
1 Today, cross-border M&A's constitute the dominant form of FDI with profound e®ects on international industry structure.
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Despite the increase in cross-border M&A's, the literature on international trade and FDI has paid little attention to this phenomenon. Instead, the focus has been the international location decisions of¯rms. 3 In this literature,¯rms typically face a trade-o® between the¯xed cost of an additional plant in the export market and the bene¯t of economizing on tari®s and trade costs. 4 The present paper investigates the link between trade costs and merger incentives in an international oligopoly. 5 To this end, key motivating questions are: What are the e®ects of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization on the nature of mergers (national or international) that emerges in equilibrium? What type of mergers (national or international) are preferred from a welfare point of view? If countries respond to mergers with optimal trade policy, which industry structures arise in equilibrium?
We consider a minimal symmetric oligopolistic industry in which¯rms sell di®erentiated goods in two segmented markets (home and foreign). The interaction takes place in two stages. In the¯rst stage, industry structure is determined:¯rms decide whether to merge domestically, internationally or stay as competing units. In the second stage,¯rms compete in prices. 6 In order to determine industry structure, we employ the approach of endogenous merger formation developed by . An important feature of the model is that the origin of¯rms is crucial. If asset owners from di®erent countries merge, the resulting¯rm is international in nature and has the advantage of avoiding tari® levels in both markets. By contrast, national¯rms face a tari® disadvantage when exporting.
We explore¯rms' incentives to form cross-border mergers under nonprohibitive tari® levels and show that two e®ects play an important role in merger formation: protection gain and tari® savings. The¯rst e®ect represents the anti-competitive impact of trade policy and it arises when¯rms are national units. The tari® savings e®ect simply captures the incentive to avoid the trade cost by merging with a¯rm in the export market. An analysis of these two e®ects shows that the tari® level and the degree of product di®erentiation together create a trade-o® between the relative attractiveness of national and international market structures. If the trade environment is restrictive, and the industry produces close substitutes, the former e®ect dominates the latter generating a tendency for national mergers. On the other hand, when the trade environment is close to free trade, the tari® savings dominates the protection gain and this dominance is stronger for highly di®erentiated products.
Next, we examine the implications of unilateral home trade liberalization at two extreme foreign tari® levels (prohibitive foreign tari® and zero tari®). We¯nd that when products are close substitutes, di®erent trade policy regimes in the foreign country can reverse the e®ects of unilateral home trade liberalization. When the foreign country practices free trade, unilateral home trade liberalization induces¯rms to form international mergers. However, when the foreign tari® is prohibitive, the impact of unilateral home trade liberalization depends on the degree of product di®erentiation: for highly di®erentiated products, the equilibrium market structure is international whereas for close substitutes, it is national. This result stems from the fact that, when there is severe competition among¯rms (i.e. when the degree of product di®erentiation is low), a highly protective trade policy regime in one country creates an incentive to merge nationally rather than internationally since the protection gain is more important than the tari® savings in determining industry structure.
Given the e®ects of unilateral trade liberalization, it is natural to ask: What are the e®ects of bilateral trade liberalization on industry structure? This interaction is examined by assuming a common exogenous tari® level in both markets and then lowering it. In contrast to unilateral trade liberalization, the tari® reduction is realized in both markets so that both the tari® savings and the protection gain from tari®s declines. Our main result here is that, as trade gets bilaterally liberalized, the resulting equilibrium market structure is the one with international mergers. This result is consistent with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in cross-border merger activities. It is important to note that equilibrium market structures following unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization seem to provide the opposite intuition to the tari® jumping argument in the FDI literature where high tari®s create an incentive for FDI. This contrast is mainly due to the endogeneity of the merger formation in our model. Here, FDI can occur only via an international merger whereas the tari® jumping argument is typically made for a single¯rm by comparing two discrete options: export or FDI.
What if countries can respond to changes in market structure via optimal tari®s? Endogenous trade policy is allowed in order to study equilibrium market structures and their welfare properties under optimal tari®s. It is found that as the market gets more concentrated nationally, each country imposes a higher tari® on imports whereas if the market gets more concentrated internationally, a country's optimal tari® actually declines. In the empirical literature, the e®ect of the industry concentration on the level of protection is inconclusive. This result provides an explanation for this ambiguity. Furthermore, the equilibrium market structure is the one with concentrated international mergers when products are highly di®erentiated whereas national mergers arise for close substitutes.
Turning to welfare, three e®ects are shown to be important in determining preferred market structures from a welfare point of view. The¯rst two e®ects are the standard anti-competitive e®ects of tari®s and market concentration on consumer welfare and producer surplus. The third e®ect is the free rider e®ect which arises under asymmetric market structures. It can be measured by the amount by which the pro¯ts of a non-merging¯rm increase when a merger happens. We¯nd that, for lower tari®s, the market structure with no mergers is the welfare champion when product substitutability is low. When trade policy is not restrictive, the main welfare concern is the anti-competitive e®ect of market concentration on consumer welfare. When products are close substitutes, there is severe competition among¯rms so that the free rider e®ect of a foreign merger to home competing¯rms tips the balance in favor of the triopoly with a foreign merger. As the tari® level increases, the tari® saving feature of international mergers becomes important and international mergers are preferred market structures from a welfare point of view since international¯rms can avoid trade costs but national¯rms can not.
Among equilibrium market structures, international market structures represent higher welfare than the national ones. This result provides support for the idea that there is scope for welfare-enhancing merger policies under a liberal trade environment. Interpreting merger policy as the choice of degree of industrial concentration, we show that social and private incentives become aligned together as trade gets bilaterally liberalized.
Our paper is related with who apply the endogenous merger formation approach to international trade and determine the equilibrium ownership structure of an international oligopoly. They show that the international pattern of ownership depends on trade and production costs. However, while investigating the e®ects of trade costs on the equilibrium ownership structures, they do not exclude prohibitive trade cost levels. This feature results in national ownership structures mainly due to the monopoly power in the domestic market. If we squeeze their results to the region of non-prohibitive trade-cost levels, the only surviving equilibrium market structure is the one with international mergers. 7 In this paper, however, we argue that concentrated national market structure can be the 7 Under Cournot competition, national mergers are never equilibrium candidates. Since Salant et. al. (1983) , it has been well known that, under quantity competition, unless the merged unit achieves very high market share, merging¯rms can actually lose from a merger. As a result, the main comparison leading to equilibrium market structure is between the market structure with international mergers and the one with no merger. equilibrium one even under non-prohibitive tari® levels. Moreover, if the trade cost is interpreted as the tari® level, the equilibrium characterization in indicates that bilateral trade liberalization results in an empty set of market structures (i.e. there is no equilibrium).
This paper shows that the choice of price as a basic strategic variable instead of quantity overcomes the non-existence problem which arises as trade liberalization occurs. Under price competition with di®erentiated products, we¯nd that unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization results in a nonempty equilibrium market structures. This result stems from the fact that under price competition, every single merger is pro¯table and there is no trivial elimination of concentrated market structures.
Brief mention must be made on the related line of research which explores pro¯tability of mergers, regulation issues, and the interaction between merger policies and trade liberalization. Examples of this line of research are: Barros and Cabral (1994) , Collie(2002) , Cowan (1989) , Head and Ries (1997) , Farrel and Shapiro (1990), Horn and Levinsohn (2001) , Richardson (1999) , and Saggi and Yildiz (2002) . Unlike the present paper, this research uses the traditional criterion for merger incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an endogenous merger formation model in a concentrated international oligopoly with differentiated products. The model is employed in Section 3 to determine the equilibrium market structure characterization following unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization. The welfare implications of trade liberalization and optimal merger policy are discussed in section 4. In Section 5, endogenous trade policy is allowed. Concluding discussion will follow. Finally, most of the calculations and proofs can be found in the appendix.
The Model
The model is a two-country partial equilibrium set-up in which countries are indexed by k, where k = h (home country), f (foreign country). Countries are identical with respect to market size and demand. In each exporting country, there is a single industry consisting of two¯rms that produce symmetrically di®erentiated products. Each¯rm is endowed with one unit of an indivisible asset assumed to be¯xed in supply. Firms are indexed by i = 1, 2, 3, 4 where 1 and 2 (3 and 4) denote home (foreign)¯rms and their assets are located in home country and foreign country respectively. Firms own the exclusive technology for their particular brand and the marginal cost of production for all¯rms is constant (c¸0).
The interaction takes place in two stages. In the¯rst stage, industry structure is determined:¯rms decide whether to merge domestically, internationally or stay as competing units. In the second stage,¯rms formed in the¯rst stage compete non-cooperatively in Bertrand fashion in two countries' markets.
Following Shubik (1980) , we adopt the following demand function for each market:
where p i is the price charged by¯rm i and q i its sales and N denotes the number of¯rms in the market. The parameter°> 0 is a measure of the substitutability of the goods. When°approaches zero, goods become unrelated and as it approaches in¯nity, goods become perfect substitutes. Note that the degree of product di®erentiation between any two goods is the same. The e®ect of trade liberalization on the equilibrium market structure can be examined by assuming exogenous tari® levels faced by exporting¯rms and then lowering those tari®s. Given these tari® levels, the origin of merginḡ rms becomes crucial. If asset owners from di®erent countries merge, the resulting¯rm is an international¯rm having the advantage of avoiding tari® levels in both markets. By contrast, national¯rms (either non merged units or constructed by merging owners from the same country) have trade protection in their own country but face a tari® disadvantage when exporting. Throughout the paper, we exclude prohibitive tari® levels since such tari®s are rarely witnessed under trade environment.
Since markets are segmented,¯rms' decisions concerning one market do not a®ect their decisions in other markets. We¯rst take the industry structure as given and analyze the product market equilibrium (second stage of the game) for home¯rms. Similar optimization procedures apply for foreign rms. We denote the tari® levels in the home and foreign country by t h and t f respectively.
In fully decentralized market structure, each non-merging home¯rm chooses its price to maximize its pro¯t taking other¯rms' prices as given:
While exporting, each non-merging home¯rm faces the tari® t f :
where i=1,2 When merging,¯rms are allowed to shut down the operation of some plants, but may not alter the characteristics of their products. Each nationally merging home¯rm in its own market solves the following problem:
Nationally merging¯rms face a disadvantage of the tari® cost when serving their export market:
The tari® cost can be avoided by merging with local producers in the export market. Thus, internationally merged¯rms (for example:¯rm 1 and rm 3) solve the same problem in both markets:
Thus far, we have taken the industry structure as given. We now turn to the¯rst stage of interaction. In determining industry structure, there are several modelling choices. The traditional merger literature considers mergers between exogenously chosen groups of¯rms. The criterion for merger incentives in this literature focuses on two market structures where one is a strict concentration of the other. Firms are said to have incentives to merge if the pro¯ts of the merged unit is higher than the combined pre-merger pro¯ts of merging units. However it does not seem reasonable when there is a ranking structure which involves many feasible market structures some of which are not strict concentration of others.
To deal with this problem, there are two main alternative approaches to endogenize merger formation. 9 First, Kamien and Zang (1990) o®ered an acquisition process modeled as follows: Each owner makes o®ers or bids for every other¯rm and announces an asking price for her own simultaneously. Equilibrium market structure is determined following a general allocation scheme once all bids and asking prices are known. Simultaneity of the bidding process implies that there are no negotiations between¯rms. This approach applies to situations where there are many¯rms and owners. In contrast, our focus is on minimal symmetric oligopoly model where¯rms are able to communicate and sign binding contracts.
Our model is built on the endogenous merger formation approach developed by . Based upon the earlier literature on mergers, and on actual observations of¯rm behavior, they take the view that merger formation can be treated as a cooperative game since parties involved in the formation process are free to communicate and sign binding contracts. 10 This approach is a generalization of traditional merger analysis since comparisons are made between all feasible market structures rather than two exogenously given market structures one of which is a strict concentration of the other.
In this model, an important concept is the dominance relation which implies that if a market structure M j is dominated by another market structure M i , the former will not be the outcome of the merger formation since it is in the interest of¯rms who have the power of enforcing M i over M j . Thesē rms are called to be \decisive¯rms" and they are directly involved in the 9 Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Ray and Vohra (1998) treat the merger formation as a non-cooperative bargaining game and also belong to in this liteature. 10 Ray and Vohra (1998) portray the merger formation as a non-cooperative extensive form bargaining game. In their model, market structure and payo® distribution are simultaneously determined. The prediction about which mergers are formed is highly sensitive to the order of o®ers and counter-o®ers. However, the present model indicates that, if any binding agreement can be renegotiated, this sensitivity problem vanishes.
process of merger formation and break-up.
11 Two assumptions are made in the merger formation process. First, any payments between coalitions are not allowed. Second, when forming a merger, participating¯rms can choose any payo® distribution among themselves subject to the constraint that the total payo® distributed be exactly equal to the merged unit's total pro¯t in the second stage of the game.
The idea behind this concept can be seen more clearly in the following example in which there are¯ve¯rms and three market structures M A = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, M B = f12; 34; 5g, and M C = f123; 4; 5g Consider¯rst the last two market structures . Firm 5 does not change its behavior in M B and M C in the sense that it stays as a competing unit in both structures. Since payments between¯rms are not allowed,¯rm 5 can not in°uence the ranking of M B and M C . Alternatively stated,¯rm 5 is not \decisive" with respect to these two market structures. Now turn to¯rms 1,2,3 and 4. If M C is formed,¯rm 4 will not participate in any merger. In order to prevent this, if¯rm 4's pro¯t is higher under M B , it may o®er to¯rm 3 a larger share of payo® of the merger under the market structure M B . On the other hand, rms 1 and 2 may make a counter-o®er to induce a merger with¯rm 3 if their pro¯t is higher under M C . As a result, by being linked to the¯rm 3 in the market structure M B ,¯rm 4 is able to bargain with¯rms 1 and 2 over rm 3's participation in a merger. This bargaining process implies that¯rms 1,2,3 and 4 have the ability to a®ect the ranking of M B and M C . Therefore, these¯rms are \decisive" with respect to these two market structures.
Decisive¯rms can be rede¯ned as follows: except for the¯rms belonging to the same coalitions in two di®erent market structures, all remaining¯rms are decisive. Note that there may be more than one group of decisive¯rms.
Consider now M
A and M B . It is clear that¯rm 5 is not a decisive¯rm since it stays as competing unit in both market structures. Firms 1 and 2 participate in a merger under M B as do¯rms 3 and 4 even though they are competing units under M
A . Therefore all four owners are decisive¯rms. However, merger formation process is not linked so that there are two decisive groups of¯rms. The¯rst decisive group is composed of¯rm 1 and¯rm 2 and the second one includes¯rm 3 and¯rm 4. As in , the decisive group of owners with respect to two di®erent market structures M i 11 Formal de¯nition of a decisive group and further detailed discussion can be found in Having identi¯ed the decisive¯rms and described how we rank any pair of market structures using dominance relation, the next question is : How can we¯nd equilibrium market structure? An equilibrium market structure is de¯ned to be the one that is undominated by any other feasible market structure. The model has the feature that¯rms merge all the way to monopoly, if permitted. This is because the combined pro¯ts of all¯rms in other market structures are smaller than monopoly pro¯ts and all parties are involved in the merger formation process. Since the focus is on the distinction between national and international mergers, highly concentrated market structures (monopoly and the duopoly with international merger of three¯rms) will be excluded within the equilibrium market structures.
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The symmetry of the model indicates that there are 10 possible ownership structures that can be represented by 5 market structures: 
In order to save on notation, later on in this paper, each market structure is referred to its¯rst ownership structure as far as this is possible.
In order to capture the seemingly complicated dominance relation, consider the following example. For market structure M I to dominate M H ,¯rm 1 and¯rm 2 should be able to convince¯rm 3 and¯rm 4 respectively to merge with them internationally. It implies that the pro¯t gain for¯rm 1 and¯rm 2 should be enough to cover any possible loss of¯rm 3 and¯rm 4. Furthermore,¯rm 1 and¯rm 2 have to make sure that they will earn more pro¯ts by breaking up a national merger and moving to the market structure with two international mergers. These conditions can be captured by following inequalities:
Addition of (7) and (8) and rearrangement yield that all owners are decisive owners and combined pro¯t of the decisive group D I&N is larger in M I than in M H for market structure M I to dominate M H :
The following decisive groups are relevant for the comparison of the market structures de¯ned above:
A-) no mergers & triopolies with one national merger ) one decisive group comprising two owners:
B-) no mergers & triopolies with one international merger ) one decisive group comprising two owners: 
H-) triopolies with one international merger & duopoly with two national mergers ) one decisive group comprising all owners:
I-) triopolies with one international merger & duopolies with two international mergers ) one decisive group comprising two owners:
J-) duopoly with two national mergers & duopolies with two international mergers ) one decisive group comprising all owners:
3 Trade Liberalization and Equilibrium Market Structures
Our aim is to identify the e®ects of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization on the equilibrium market structure in a concentrated international oligopolistic market. Therefore, we exclude prohibitive tari® levels in the following corollary to highlight how the incentives to form national and international mergers are in°uenced by tari® levels. Basically, we examine a situation where countries can not shut out their markets in any market structure.
Corollary 1
The prohibitive tari® levels in each market structure are as follows:
where subscripts (h for home country, f for foreign country) of t represents the country in which tari® is imposed while superscript denotes the market structure.
Note that for symmetric market structures (M O , M 1I and M N ), there is no need for a subscript. As it is seen clearly from the above ranking structure, the same concentration level of importing¯rms result in the same prohibitive tari® levels irrespective of domestic concentration. Moreover, the duopoly with two international mergers inherently eliminates tari® protection. Hereafter, t 1I indicates the upper limit of tari® protection:
Unilateral Trade Liberalization
Here, we examine the e®ect of unilateral trade liberalization by assuming exogenous tari® levels (t h and t f ) faced by exporting¯rms in both markets, and then lowering one of the tari® levels keeping the other unchanged. 16 To this end, a dominance function is de¯ned as the di®erence of the combined pro¯t of the decisive¯rms between any two market structures. Using results from traditional criterion for merger incentives, it is well known that merger pro¯tability increases with merger size. Therefore, our focus will be on concentrated market structures. Given the tari® saving assumption, the comparison of duopoly with two international mergers (M I ) with other market structures is taken as a base scenario. The dominance function is de¯ned as follows:
where j represents market structures other than M I . Since the combined pro¯ts of the decisive¯rms under M I are not a®ected by any change in the tari® levels, we need to focus on the combined pro¯t of the decisive¯rms under other market structures compared with M I : In these comparisons, in each decisive group (if there is more than one), there is an equal number of decisive¯rms either protected for or against with home tari®s. Given this fact, we need to identify the decisive forces in the merger formation process.
Role of Trade Protection and Tari® Saving
There are two counteracting e®ects in the merger formation stage of the game. First of them is the protection gain which represents the anti-competitive impact of the trade policy. This e®ect arises when¯rms are formed as national units. The second e®ect is the tari® savings that creates incentives to merge internationally in order to avoid tari®s in the export market.
In order to capture the idea behind these two e®ects, consider the dominance function with respect to international duopoly (M I ) and national duopoly (M N ). As noted above, there is only one decisive group composed of all four¯rms with respect to these two market structures. Therefore, industry pro¯t levels are compared under these market structures. It is obvious that the industry pro¯t under international duopoly (M I ) does not depend on home and foreign tari®s (t h and t f respectively) since¯rms avoid tari®s by merging internationally, whereas the tari® level a®ects industry pro¯t under the national duopoly (M N ). It implies that any pro¯t di®erence is due to home and foreign tari®s:
Aggregate pro¯ts earned by home national merger can be written as follows: (12) where q e 12 represents the amount of output exported by a home merger. First term in (12) represents the home merger's pro¯t in the absence of home and foreign tari®s. The second and third terms measure the change in the home merger's aggregate pro¯ts net of tari® payment relative to a situation in which both countries practice free trade (t h = t f = 0). It stems from the fact that the tari® protection leads to an increase in the home and foreign merger's price level. The foreign price level exceeds the home price level since the home merger's reaction function has a slope uniformly less than one. This results in an increase in the home merger's market share as well. It can be shown that, under non-prohibitive tari® levels, aggregate pro¯t in both countries net of tari® burden increases in the tari® levels. Therefore, the addition of second and third terms has a positive sign unless products are highly di®erentiated. These two terms indicate protection gain which captures the anti-competitive e®ect of tari®s. The last term, the tari® burden for home¯rms, lowers the home merger's aggregate pro¯t relative to free trade.
Similarly, foreign merger's pro¯t can be written as follows:
, dominance function is found as follows:
17 Naturally, aggregate pro¯ts are the same when t h = t f = 0
Whether M I dominates M N or not depends on the balance between the tari® savings incentive of¯rms to form international duopoly (M I ) in order to avoid the tari® burden and the protection gain to form national duopoly (M N ). The former incentive is captured by the¯rst two terms in (14) , while the latter is captured by the last two terms in (14) .
Since we examine unilateral home trade liberalization, our focus is on thē rst term and the third term in the equation (14) . 18 The balance between the tari® savings and the protection gain is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given the foreign tari® (t f ), d
I&j (t h ,t f ) is a concave function of the home tari® (t h ).
As noted above, the anti-competitive e®ect of tari® protection increases in the home tari® level. For lower home tari®s, the tari® savings dominates the protection gain. However, under a very protectionist home trade policy regime, the former e®ect is dominated by the latter. It implies that unilateral home trade liberalization results in an increase in the dominance of international duopoly over other market structures for higher home tari® levels and a decrease for lower ones.
It is important to emphasize that the degree of product di®erentiation is also an important determinant of the relative strengths of these two counteracting e®ects. The level of competition among¯rms is directly a®ected by the substitutability level (°) among products. When products are close substitutes, competition is severe and¯rms are close to the Bertrand paradox. In that case, tari® protection provides room for national¯rms to enjoy pro¯ts in highly competitive trade environment so that the protection gain is more pronounced when substitutability level (°) is high. For highly differentiated products,¯rms have some market power resulting from di®erent characteristics of their products so that marginal bene¯t of tari® protection is relatively low.
The symmetry of the model implies that same results apply for unilateral foreign trade liberalization. Therefore, two extreme foreign tari® levels are taken into consideration since the dominance function takes lowest values at these tari® levels and this helps us to generalize the result for unilateral trade liberalization. Consider¯rst the case that foreign country practices free trade so that t f = 0.
19 Later on, we will also discuss the case where foreign country practices very restrictive trade policy regime (t f = t 1I ) in order to more fully capture the e®ects of unilateral home trade liberalization.
Free Trade Abroad and Unilateral Trade Liberalization
Since exporting home¯rms face a zero tari® abroad, only the tari® savings in the home country is relevant and it can arise via an international merger. The following characterization of the set of equilibrium market structure (EMS) supports the idea that unilateral trade liberalization yields more cross-border mergers when the trading partner is a free trade country: Proposition 2 Given that the foreign country practices free trade (t f = 0), the equilibrium market structure (EMS) characterization is as follows: nd where t 1I represents the upper limit on the non-prohibitive tari® levels given in (10) .
As it is seen from the above result, the home tari® level (t h ) and the level of substitutability among products (°) together act as crucial determinants of the relative strengths of the protection gain and the tari® savings. The pattern of equilibrium market structures is illustrated in Figure 1 . When substitutability level is low, there is a little competition among¯rms since they have some market power stemming from di®erent characteristics of their products. Therefore, tari® protection does not have a great impact on the demand for home products. Moreover, it can be easily veri¯ed that the critical tari® level (t I&N cr ) increases in the degree of product di®erentiation. When products are highly di®erentiated, the critical tari® level (t I&N cr ) exceeds the upper limit of non-prohibitive tari® levels (t 1I ) so that the tari® savings dominates the protection gain for every non-prohibitive tari® levels. As a result, 19 Due to symmetry, analogous results apply for the foreign country.
the duopoly market structure with international mergers dominates market structures with national mergers. On the other hand, when products are close substitutes, product market experiences severe competition which makes the protection gain more decisive in determining industry structure. Combined with high substitutability levels, protective home trade policy regime gives rms more incentives to form national mergers.
As it is seen from¯gure 1, the equilibrium set of market structures is nonempty for all non-prohibitive tari® levels irrespective of the degree of product di®erentiation. In this sense, the model is well-behaved. 20 This pattern of market structures yields the result that as home country gets unilaterally liberalized, given that the foreign country practices free trade, international mergers become the mode of industry structure. 
Restrictive Trade Policy Abroad and Unilateral Trade Liberalization
Recall that concavity of the dominance function indicates that it is minimized at two limit points¯rst of which was discussed in the previous section. Now suppose that the tari® level in the foreign country is very high:
where t 1I is the upper limit of non-prohibitive tari® levels. This assumption makes the trade environment more protectionist so that the protection gain is expected to dominate the tari® savings on a broader range of tari® and substitutability levels. Intuitively, extra pro¯ts needed to transfer to foreign¯rms in order to convince them to get involved in an international merger depends not only on the home tari® level but also on the substitutability levels. Equilibrium characterization represents the balance between these two determinants:
Proposition 3 Given that the foreign country practices restrictive trade policy (t f = t 1I ), the equilibrium market structure (EMS) characterization is are critical home tari® levels which equate industry pro¯ts under national duopoly and international duopoly (M N and M I ) so that¯rms are indi®erent between these two market structures.
There are several signi¯cant insights provided by this proposition. Figure  2 illustrates the pattern of equilibrium market structures in the home country for di®erent home tari® (t h ) and substitutability levels (°). Our¯rst observation is that, as under free trade, the set of equilibrium market structures is non empty for every tari® and substitutability levels.
Second, in comparison to the case where the foreign country practices free trade, a more protectionist trade environment induces¯rms to merge nationally unless products are highly di®erentiated. When product substitutability is low, weak competition yields greater tari® savings through international merger than the protection gain which arises due to a national merger. It is a result of the fact that the anti-competitive e®ects of tari® protection is less important since¯rms already have market power stemming from product di®erentiation. Therefore, duopoly with two international mergers survives as the dominant market structure for all home tari® levels when products are highly di®erentiated.
For intermediate substitutability levels, the equilibrium characterization is more complicated: relatively high and low home tari® levels result in a national duopoly as the equilibrium market structure. Intuitively, since the tari® level is very restrictive in the foreign country and kept¯xed within the unilateral home trade liberalization process, home¯rms are ready to transfer a larger share of pro¯ts to foreign¯rms to form an international merger if the protection in the home country is not very high. However, at the same time, as the home tari® level falls too much and substitutability level increases, it becomes harder to convince foreign¯rms to give up the protection gain and get involved in an international merger since the tari® savings incentives of foreign¯rms fall and the protection gain rises even further. On the other hand, when the home country's trade policy is restrictive as in the foreign country, it creates a very protective trade environment encouraging national market structures. When products are close substitutes, national duopoly becomes the only equilibrium market structure irrespective of home tari® levels. This is because it is no longer possible to convince foreign¯rms to form international merger since the di®erence between the protection gain and the tari® savings is greater than what home¯rms are able to o®er for any home tari® levels.
If these two extreme foreign trade policy cases are compared, the biggest di®erence occurs when the products are relatively close substitutes. Di®er-ent trade policy regimes in the rival country reverse the e®ects of unilateral trade liberalization. A liberal trade environment in the foreign country yields the result that unilateral home trade liberalization induces¯rms to form international market structure irrespective of the degree of product di®eren-tiation. However, if foreign country practices very restrictive trade policy, national ownership structure happens to be equilibrium when products are close substitutes. 
Bilateral Trade Liberalization
The e®ects of bilateral trade liberalization on the equilibrium market structure can be examined by assuming a common exogenous tari® level (t 1 = t 2 =t) in both markets and then lowering it. The di®erence from the case of unilateral trade liberalization is that the reduction in tari®s is realized in both markets so that both the tari® savings and the protection gain from tari®s decline. Because of market segmentation, the same prohibitive tari® levels are valid in both markets so that the upper limit of tari® levels is again t 1I . In order to identify forces which have impacts on the ranking of market structures, we can compare aggregate pro¯ts under international and national duopolies (M I and M N ) as in (14) by replacing home and foreign tari®s (t h and t f ) by a common tari® (t). The following result supports the idea that cross border mergers become a major mode of industry restructuring following bilateral trade liberalization: Proposition 4 Given that the home and foreign tari® levels are equal to t (t h = t f =t), the set of the equilibrium market structure (EMS) is as follows: i-) International duopoly ( and t 1I represents the upper limit of non-prohibitive tari® levels given in (10). This proposition points to two important features. First, the set of the equilibrium market structures is non-empty for almost all tari® levels. The only exception occurs when substitutability levels (°) are in the intermediate range and trade policy is restrictive. The intransitiveness of the dominance relationship becomes important for this range of tari® and substitutability levels (7.12>°>5.88 and t I&N cr < t < t 1I ). It can be shown that M N dominates M i where i=O,H,F,I in this given region. But it is also the case that, for the same region, M N is dominated by M 1I which is dominated by M I for all tari® and substitutability levels. Therefore, there is no equilibrium market structure in this region. Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of equilibrium market structures for di®erent tari® (t) and substitutability levels (°).
Secondly, the proposition seems to provide the opposite intuition to the tari® jumping argument in the FDI literature since higher protection yields nationally concentrated¯rms for close substitutes. This counterintuitive result is due to the endogeneity of the merger formation model. In the FDI literature, the tari® jumping argument is made for a single¯rm by focusing on two alternatives: export or FDI. These two options are compared under trade policy regime without changing the concentration level in the market. However it is important to note that, using the model speci¯ed in this paper, FDI occurs via an international merger and all decisive¯rms involved in the merger formation process bene¯t from tari® savings and lose from tari® protection in their domestic markets. In the FDI literature, on the other hand, rms investing in the foreign country directly enjoy tari® savings without losing their gains from protection. 
and M
1I . These decisive owners save on tari®s via an international merger which is the dominant form of FDI. To understand the incentives to form an international merger (or to do FDI), the pro¯t of nationally exporting¯rm under M O can be compared with the pro¯t of the internationally merginḡ rm under M 1I . To this end, the following incentive function can be de¯ned:
It can be easily veri¯ed that this incentive function is monotonically increasing in the common tari® level:
However the approach used in this paper is more general than the one employed above since it can be applied to situations with more than one concentrative merger and all feasible market structures can be compared with each other through dominance relationships. Given these di®erences between approaches, the counterintuitive result stems from the tension between the tari® savings and the protection gain of decisive¯rms in the merger formation process.
Welfare Implications and Merger Policy
Throughout the paper, we assume that very concentrated market structures are excluded by setting an upper limit on HHI. An important question is whether the equilibrium market structures found above are the ones that are preferable from a welfare point of view or not. A country's aggregate welfare is de¯ned as the sum of its consumer surplus, total pro¯t earned by its¯rms in both markets and tari® revenue under di®erent market structures: Even though no speci¯c payo® division in any merger is assumed, since the feasible market structures are completely symmetric from welfare point of view when t h =t f , it is reasonable to assume that pro¯ts are evenly divided between merging¯rms.
We can identify several forces that impact the welfare ranking of di®erent market structures. First, as in the closed economy, there is standard tradeo® between the impact of concentration on producer surplus and consumer welfare. In the open economy, part of the cost of domestic concentration is transmitted to foreign consumers. Second, domestic tari®s protect national rms in the domestic country whereas foreign tari®s punish them in the export market. Moreover, consumer welfare decreases in tari®s. Note that this second source of tension vanishes completely under a duopoly with two international mergers and partly under a triopoly with one international merger. Third, under asymmetric market structures (M H , M F , and M 1I ), a merger confers a large positive externality (free rider e®ect) on competinḡ rms. The degree of the free rider e®ect can be measured by the amount by which the pro¯ts of a non-merging¯rm increase when a merger happens. As in Davidson and Deneckere (1985) , the free rider e®ect of a merger is so strong that the pro¯ts of non-merging¯rms exceed those of the merged unit:
Similarly, under the triopoly with one international merger (M 1I ), merging¯rms enjoy free rider e®ect that arises due to tari®s national competing¯rms face. Figure 4 illustrates the pattern of most preferred market structures for di®erent tari® (t) and substitutability levels (°).
We¯rst examine the case when the tari® rates are low. Under a relatively liberal trade environment, the anti-competitive e®ect of trade policy on consumer welfare and producer surplus is not very important from a welfare point of view. Also, when the level of product substitutability is low, the free rider e®ect under asymmetric market structures is not strong. Thus, in such a situation, the most important concern is the anti-competitive e®ect of market concentration on consumer welfare and producer surplus. As expected, the least concentrated market structure (M O ) is the most preferred market structure when products are highly di®erentiated. For close substitutes, however, there is a severe competition among¯rms so that the free rider e®ect of a foreign merger to home competing¯rms tips the balance in favor of the triopoly with foreign merger (M F ). As the tari® level increases, the tari® savings of international mergers get more pronounced as do the the anti-competitive e®ect of the trade policy on consumer welfare. For intermediate range of tari® levels, the free rider e®ect under international triopoly (M 1I ) is the main reason why M 1I is the most preferred market structure. When trade policy is restrictive, the duopoly with two international mergers (M I ) is the most preferred market structure for all substitutability levels. Note that even though consumers lose from concentration and there is no tari® revenue, the tari® savings dominate the other counteracting e®ects.
Having identi¯ed the welfare ranking of di®erent market structures, we now come to the second important question: Among equilibrium market structures (M I and M N ), which one is the most preferable from a welfare point of view? The following result is immediate:
Proposition 5 Given that the home and foreign tari® levels are equal to t (t h = t f =t), the duopoly with two international mergers (M I ) yields higher national and world welfare than the duopoly with two national mergers (M N ) for all tari® and substitutability levels.
Since competition policy is assumed to allow two mergers consisting of two¯rms,¯rms' incentives are binding in this set-up. Given the above equilibrium market structures, it is clear that the duopoly with two international mergers (M I ) yields the same welfare level as the duopoly with two national mergers (M N ) when both countries practice free trade (t h = t f =0):
In order to rank these two market structures from a welfare point of view, we use di®erential techniques. The welfare under the duopoly with two national mergers (M N ) can be expressed as follows:
where q e (q i ) represents the amount of output exported (imported) by a national merger.
Equation (16) decomposes the welfare under M N into six terms. The sum of the¯rst and third components is the aggregate welfare when both countries practice free trade. The second and fourth terms measure the anti-competitive e®ect of the trade policy on consumer surplus and producer surplus (net of tari® payment) respectively. Last two terms measure the tari® payments on exports and tari® revenue which arises due to imports.
As noted above, there is a complete symmetry under these two market structures (M I and M N ) and same tari® level (t h = t f =t) is assumed in two markets. Therefore, tari® payments and tari® revenue are identical:
Using the equations (15), (16), and (17), we can compare the welfare level under M I and M N as follows:
First term in equation (18) measures the decrease in consumer welfare due to trade protection relative to free trade. Since prices increase due to tari®s, the¯rst term has a negative sign. The second term, on the other hand, measures the change in aggregate pro¯ts net of tari® payment relative to a situation in which both countries practice free trade. As noted above in equation (12), the second term has a positive sign unless products are highly di®erentiated. Thus, the welfare ranking of equilibrium market structures depends on the balance between the anti-competitive e®ect of the trade protection on the consumer welfare and producer surplus. Given the demand function in our model, the former e®ect dominates the latter so that M I dominates M N in terms of welfare for all substitutability and tari® levels:
Note that due to the symmetry of these two market structures, analogous results apply for the world welfare. The above welfare analysis points out that there is scope for welfare-enhancing merger policies. Along the line of the literature investigating international linkages between trade and merger policies, a frequent concern has been the possibility that trade liberalization may induce countries to use more lax competition policies, in narrower sense merger policies, to promote national interests at the expense of others. Incentives for a welfare maximizing government to make such a substitution can be examined by interpreting merger policy as a choice of degree of industrial concentration. 21 Competition authorities have the ability to impact resulting equilibrium market structure characterization through merger policies speci¯ed in the merger guidelines.
22 Suppose that they can choose an upper limit of concentration level above which any merger proposal is blocked. The equilibrium market structure characterization in Proposition 4 and the above welfare ranking together imply that competition authorities have less incentive to block merger as trade gets liberalized if a duopoly of two mergers are permitted. Trade liberalization induces more cross border ownerships (M I ) which results in higher welfare than national market structures (M N ). In other words, social and private incentives converge to each other as trade gets bilaterally liberalized.
Next question is related with the equilibrium market structures under optimal tari® levels. To this end, one more step will be added to the original game employed so far in order to endogenize trade policy as well.
Endogenous Trade Policy
Thus far, our analysis does not recognize the fact that trade policy in each country may respond to changes in market structure. To allow for this interaction, consider the following game. In the¯rst stage,¯rm owners decide on the merger formation so that industry structure is determined. Next, each country chooses a speci¯c tari® t on imports. In the last stage,¯rms compete in prices in the product market.
Each country chooses its tari® to maximize its welfare. The tari® ranking shows that as the market gets more concentrated nationally, higher tari® is imposed on the imports. The optimal tari® rate decreases in the number of international mergers so that lowest optimal tari® level is realized under international triopolies:
and t
This result argues that the interaction between the level of protection and the industry concentration depends on the nature of the mergers (national or international). 24 Moreover, among national triopolies, the impact of the concentration of domestic¯rms on the optimal tari® is greater for high substitutability levels relative to the impact of concentration of foreign¯rms. This is because the protection gain increases with the degree of product substitutability.
Having ranked the optimal tari® rates, two immediate questions are: When countries can respond to mergers via optimal tari®s, what is the set of equilibrium market structures? and among these market structures, which are the ones that are preferred from a welfare point of view?
The following proposition is immediate: Proposition 6 Under optimal trade policy: i-) International duopoly (M I ) is the equilibrium market structure if°< 8:72. ii-) National duopoly (M N ) is the equilibrium market structure if°> 8:72. iii-) International duopoly (M I ) is the most preferred market structure from a welfare point of view for all substitutability levels (°).
In terms of equilibrium market structures, optimal trade policy regime yields results similar to those obtained in our analysis of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization. The¯rst two parts of proposition 6 states that the protection gain dominates the tari® savings for close substitutes and vice versa if products are di®erentiated enough. Therefore, the equilibrium market structure is the duopoly with two national mergers (M N ) for higher substitutability levels and the duopoly with two international mergers (M I ) for lower ones.
Allowing for endogenous trade policy yields the duopoly with two international mergers (M I ) as the most preferred market structure from a welfare point of view for all substitutability levels. Since the optimal tari® levels change with the concentration of the industry, less concentrated market structures are dominated by the duopoly with two international mergers (M I ) in terms of welfare. One can easily con¯rm this result by using¯gure 4 since 24 There are number of empirical studies that explores the interaction between the industry concentration and the level of protection. The results are inconclusive. Whereas Tre°er (1993) , Gawande (1997) , and Bandyopadhyay and Gawande (2000) found significant positive relationships between industry concentration and the level of protection, Baldwin (1985) , and Anderson and Baldwin (1987) report a negative relationship. The present paper provides one explanation for this ambiguity in the sense that the nature of the concentration (national or international) is important in determining optimal trade policy.
the lowest optimal tari® rate falls to the area where the duopoly with two international mergers (M I ) is the most preferred market structure. Whether optimal trade policy regime is welfare-enhancing or not depends on the substitutability level among products. For very close substitutes, optimal trade policy responses result in the least desired market structure (M N ) as the equilibrium market structure. When the products are di®erentiated enough, private and social incentives tend to move together.
Conclusion
This paper explores the international linkages between industry structure and trade liberalization. The objective has been to ask how industry restructures following trade liberalization. This is a meaningful question because over the last two decades the world economy has experienced the largest ever merger movement with a high incidence of cross border mergers and acquisitions. Despite the increase in cross-border M&A's, the literature on international trade and FDI has paid little attention to this phenomenon.
The model endogenizes merger formation under price competition in an international oligopolistic market. We explore¯rms' incentives to form crossborder mergers and show that two e®ects play an important role in merger formation: protection gain and tari® savings. The former e®ect represents the anti-competitive impact of trade policy which arises when¯rms are national whereas the latter captures the incentives to avoid trade costs via an international merger. An analysis of these two e®ects shows that the tari® level and the degree of product di®erentiation together create a trade-o® between the relative attractiveness of national and international market structures tō rms.
We¯nd that when products are close substitutes, di®erent trade policy regimes in the foreign country can reverse the e®ects of unilateral home trade liberalization. Furthermore, under bilateral trade liberalization, the tari® reduction is realized in both markets so that both the tari® savings and the protection gain are lower relative to unilateral trade liberalization. Our main result is that, as trade gets bilaterally liberalized, the resulting equilibrium market structure is the one with international mergers. This result¯ts well with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in international merger activity.
From a welfare perspective, international mergers are found to be preferable to national mergers due to the fact that they help avoid trade costs. This result provides support for the idea that there is scope for welfare-enhancing merger policies under a liberal trade environment. Interpreting merger policy as the choice of industrial concentration, we show that social and private incentives become aligned together as trade gets liberalized.
Following trade liberalization, other aspects of economic policy that are not harmonized have begun to receive more attention. The reduction in tari® rates has raised the issue of harmonization of competition policies. In policy making, national mergers are often viewed di®erently from cross-border mergers. Even though this study does not model harmonization explicitly, this discrimination can be captured simply through di®erent¯xed regulation fees imposed on national and international mergers. We intend to pursue this in future research.
Appendix
All supporting calculations not provided in the text are given below.
Corollary 1
Prohibitive tari® level under a given market structure equates the equilibrium quantity to zero. They are found as follows:
Ranking structure of prohibitive tari® levels is as follows:
Proposition 1
Concavity of the dominance function is satis¯ed by second order di®er-entiation:
concavity is satis¯ed by second order di®erentiation: This completes the proof of the last part and thus the proof of proposition 4.
Proposition 6
Under each market structure, optimal tari® levels are as follows: 
